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Abstract— In this paper, the concept and recent development of 
exploiting frequency diverse array (FDA) and its variants for the 
physical-layer wireless security have been revisited and carefully 
examined. Following rigorous analytical derivation and illustrative 
simulations, the authors argue that the investigations performed in some 
recent works did not reveal one critical issue facing the real-world 
applications, and system models established and used before were based 
on an unrealistic assumption, i.e. that the legitimate and eavesdropping 
users at different ranges sample the signal waveforms at the same time 
instant. This misunderstanding results in conclusions that are misleading. 
The authors aim to take the first step to divert research efforts and rectify 
the previous problematic analyses. The authors prove that the FDA cannot 
secure a free-space wireless transmission in range domain, because the 
previously claimed ‘secure reception region’ propagates in range domain 
as time elapses.  
 
Index Terms—Directional modulation, frequency diverse array (FDA), 
physical-layer wireless security, radiation patterns 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Directional Modulation (DM) is a type of keyless physical-layer 
wireless security technique, which, in its original form, is able to 
transmit desired signal waveforms with information modulated only 
along pre-selected directions, while distorting the waveforms along all 
other spatial directions in free space [1]–[4]. In this fashion the 
information transmitted wirelessly in free space can only be reliably 
recovered by legitimate receivers positioned along those selected 
directions, enhancing security directly at physical layer. The technique 
is very attractive for security applications of modern radio systems, as 
it does not require mathematically generated cryptographic keys and 
supports a very simple receiver’s architecture. However, the biggest 
issue for real-life applications is its inability to provide security in 
range-domain when line-of-sight (LoS) communication links are 
concerned, i.e. any eavesdropper located at the same direction as the 
legitimate receiver is able to intercept the information that is supposed 
only for the legitimate receiver.  
Recent theoretical works in [5]–[15] attempted to solve this 
problem. The proposed solutions combine DM with a Frequency 
Diverse Array (FDA) – a technique used in radar systems to illuminate 
target at a given range with a multi-frequency signal of short duration. 
If successful, the combination of FDA-DM would have allowed 
unprecedented levels of wireless security, offering to securely transmit 
information to almost any wireless device without the need for 
traditional cryptographic encryption algorithms, avoiding problem of 
 
 
key distribution. 
Despite promising theoretical results, to the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, currently there is no experimental validation of the 
FDA-DM that demonstrates its alleged security in range domain. This 
mismatch between theoretical and experimental work decelerates 
further development of DM, as the combination of FDA with DM so 
far did not deliver on its promise of security without encryption. 
However, a brief observation was made in [16], [17] relating to the 
potential problem of time-invariance of FDA systems in the context of 
radiation-pattern optimization.  
This paper provides the first in-depth analysis into the mechanisms 
of the FDA-DM security in range domain. It significantly extends the 
analyses provided in [5]–[15] in order to include a more generic 
approach with time as the third missing variable. Proposed analysis 
demonstrates that the so obtained security in range-domain cannot be 
time-invariant and that the “secure region” propagates with time. The 
provided results are generic for any FDA-based security technique, 
regardless of the antenna structure and secrecy metric used. 
II. FREQUENCY DIVERSE ARRAY 
The concept of FDA was first introduced in [18], [19]. It employs 
array elements that radiate electromagnetic waves with slightly 
different frequencies, where the frequency differences are assumed to 
be many orders smaller than the reference carrier frequency. Fig. 1 
illustrates a one-dimensional (1D) uniformly spaced N-element FDA 
with a linear carrier frequency increment ∆f applied across the array. 
The first array element is taken as the reference with its excitation at 
the carrier frequency f0. Here ∆f << f0. 
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Fig. 1.  Illustration of a 1D FDA with uniform frequency increment ∆f. 
 
It was presented in [18] and [19] that the ‘beamforming patterns’ 
are angle-range dependent. Two aspects need to be emphasized; 
1) The term ‘beamforming patterns’ used in [18] and [19] is not the 
same concept as the ‘far-field radiation patterns’ commonly used in 
the literature on antenna engineering, since the latter by definition 
refers to single frequency [20]. The ‘beamforming patterns’ can be 
instead interpreted as ‘normalized electric (or magnetic) field 
distribution in the far-field’; 
2) The ‘beamforming patterns’ are also a function of time. Since in 
[18] and [19] the radiated waveforms were designed to be very short 
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pulses for Radar applications, the time instant t associated with the 
detected electric field at a certain distance R is thus uniquely 
determined, i.e. t = R/c where c is the speed of light. In other words, 
the ‘beamforming patterns’ shown in [18] and [19] are not 
snap-shots at a certain time instant, but a series of snap-shots 
presented as a function of single parameter that combines time and 
range as t = R/c. This angle-range dependent ‘beamforming 
patterns’ of the pulsed FDA have been extensively investigated 
since then, resulting in a number of promising pulsed FDA Radar 
systems, seen in [21]–[23] and references therein. However, 
contrary to Radar applications, in order to establish a wireless 
communication link (the scope of the FDA systems studied in this 
paper), a continuous electromagnetic wave needs to be transmitted 
to carry information. Thus, the detected electric (or magnetic) field 
at each angle-range coordinate varies with time, i.e. ‘beamforming 
patterns’ are functions of angle, range and time. 
 
In the meantime, another research effort on Directional Modulation 
(DM) was made in the antenna and propagation community. Most 
early DM works could only securely transfer narrow band signals. 
Therefore, the authors in [24] made the first effort in combining FDA 
with DM so that an OFDM modulated DM system was constructed. 
Here, the FDA transmits signal waveforms continuously in time, 
different to pulsed signals for FDA Radar applications. No 
range-domain security was claimed in [24]. 
Inspired by the FDA range-angle dependent beamforming patterns, 
and its first introduction to the DM systems, many recent research 
efforts have been focused on using FDA concept to secure free space 
DM systems in range domain, e.g. [5]–[7], resulting so-called 
FDA-DM systems. However, an important factor was overlooked, 
since the FDA range-angle dependent beamforming patterns are also 
functions of time. This indicates that the secure reception regions 
(normally defined as the locations where the received bit error rates 
(BERs) are below a specified threshold) propagate in range as time 
elapses. This is analyzed in more detail in the subsequent section. 
III. DM AND FDA IN THEIR GENERAL FORMS 
In this section, we present mathematical modelling of both DM and 
FDA in their general forms, from which the previously reported 
FDA-DM fusion systems can be derived in Section III, leaving their 
discussions revealing the flaws in Section IV. 
A. DM 
For a 1D N-element transmit array, e.g. the one shown in Fig. 1 with 
∆f being set to zero, the received far-field electric (or magnetic) field F 
can be expressed as 
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where H  = [H1, H2, …, HN] is the channel vector, and ‘[·]T’ refers to 
vector transpose operator. d is the uniform spacing between two 
consecutive array elements. r1 denotes the displacement between the 
first antenna (as the reference) and the far-field observation point. θ is 
the spatial direction with respect to the array, ranging from 0 to π 
defined in Fig. 1. In order to achieve DM functionality [2], in general 
form the array excitation vector G  is designed to be 
 
( )0p q
= +G DH W .                                (2) 
 
Here D is a complex number, representing a symbol (i.e. information 
modulated in IQ space) intended for transmission. Vector W is power 
normalized, i.e. †WW = 1, and it lies in the null space of channel vector 
( )0H , i.e. ( )0
T WH = 0. ‘[·]*’ and ‘[·]†’ denote conjugation and 
vector Hermitian transpose, respectively. θ0 is the desired secure 
communication direction. p and q determine the power allocation 
between useful information D and orthogonal artificial noise W . 
When inserting (2) into (1), we get 
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From (3), we can see that the information D (or associated modulation 
waveforms) are transferred to the legitimate user along θ = θ0, while 
for other directions the information D are contaminated with the 
randomly updated artificial noise W , greatly reducing probability of 
interception.  
 
B. FDA 
In this subsection, we mathematically describe how an FDA, shown 
in Fig. 1, operates. The radio frequency (RF) carrier frequency applied 
at each antenna element is 
 
 fn = f0 + (n–1)·∆f.       n = 1, 2, …, N                   (4) 
 
For this uniformly spaced 1D FDA array, the received (pathloss being 
normalized out) far-field electric (or magnetic) field B along a spatial 
direction θ in free space can be written as 
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where An = Dvnexp(jφn) is the excitation of the nth array element, with 
scalar valued vn of amplitude and φn of phase in its initial state. 
Without loss of generality, vnexp(jφn) is set to be unity for each n. 
The phase term ϕn, seen in (5) can be further expressed as  
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The last term in the bracket in (6) is extremely tiny for practical FDA 
configurations. For example, when ∆f = 10 kHz, f0 = 3 GHz, d = 
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c/(2f0), and N = 10, this last phase term is less than 0.05º. This term is 
thus omitted hereafter. The phase difference with respect to the signal 
radiated by the first antenna is  
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The beamforming pattern B in (5) reaches its peaks when the phases 
of every summation terms are aligned. It requires ∆n to be 2knπ for 
each n. kn can be any arbitrary integers. Equivalently, 
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This shows how the beamforming pattern peaks change with angle θ, 
range r1, and time t. 
When (8) is satisfied, 
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which means the information D is delivered to the coordinate (θ, r1) at 
the time instant t, with a beamforming gain of 20log10(N) in dB. 
Since z can be any integer, there are infinite solutions to (8), meaning 
no wireless security can be achieved with FDA alone. 
IV. PREVIOUSLY REPORTED FDA-DM SYSTEMS 
When realizing FDAs can generate angle-range dependent 
beamforming patterns, plenty of efforts have been made to incorporate 
FDA concept into DM transmitters [6]–[11], claiming that the 
information D can be securely delivered to a pre-specified angle-range 
coordinate, saying (θ0, R). The general form of the resulting FDA-DM 
systems reported in previous works is formulated in this section.  
Note: In Section IV, the authors will argue that the resulting 
FDA-DM systems, however, CANNOT secure information in range 
domain as what the reported works have claimed. This is because an 
important fact that FDA beamforming patterns at each spatial location 
are time-dependent was overlooked. 
Combining FDA and DM, namely applying baseband DM 
excitation vector G  in (2) onto the frequency shifted RF carriers in 
(5), the electric (or magnetic) field in any far-field location (θ, r1) 
becomes 
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Here Gn is the nth entry of the vector G . Replacing Gn in (2) into (10), 
we get 
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where Wn is the nth entry of the vector W . The same tiny phase as the 
last term in (6) is safely ignored here. 
The previously reported FDA-DM works [5]– [11] claimed that for 
a desired receiver’s located at (θ0, R) the information D can be 
uniquely conveyed to the desired receiver at (θ0, R) only. This is under 
assumption that the receiver samples signals at a reference time t = 0, 
when ∆f of the transmitted signal is designed to be c/R.  
In these conditions, (11) becomes  
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For locations other than (θ0, R), the second summation in (11) is 
non-zero at t = 0, acting as orthogonal artificial noise in both angle and 
range domains.  
A simulation example of (11) is illustrated in Fig. 2 with FDA-DM 
system parameters listed in Table I. From Fig. 2, it can be seen that the 
QPSK modulated waveforms are only preserved in a pre-identified 
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Fig. 2.  Simulation example of previously reported FDA-DM system in its 
general form in (11). System parameters are listed in Table I. (a) Magnitudes 
and (b) phases of electric (or magnetic) fields in angle domain when r1 = R = 30 
km; (c) Magnitudes and (d) phases of electric (or magnetic) fields in range 
domain when θ = θ0 = 40º (pathloss is removed for illustration purpose). 
 
TABLE I 
SYSTEM PARAMETERS OF A PREVIOUSLY REPORTED FDA-DM EXAMPLE IN ITS 
GENERAL FORM IN (11) 
Parameter Value 
f0 3 GHz 
R 30 km 
θ0 40º 
 f c/R = 10 kHz 
N 10 
d 0.5c/f0 = 5 cm 
p 0.5 
q 0.5 
t 0 
D Randomly generated QPSK symbols 
{exp(jπ/4); exp(j3π/4); exp(−jπ/4); exp(−j3π/4)} 
Number of simulated 
symbols 
40 
 
location (θ0 = 40º, R = 30 km), achieving so-called secure wireless 
transmission in both angle and range domains. Two special cases are: 
a) when ∆f = 0, the second summation term in (11) is not a function of 
range (excluding the identical time harmonic term at f0 for every n), 
indicating no artificial noise is injected in range domain; b) when q = 0 
(irrespective of the choice of ∆f), the second summation term in (11) is 
zero, indicating no artificial noise is injected in both angle and range 
domains. Readers can perform the simulations to verify the special 
cases if interested. The results are omitted here for brevity. The secure 
reception region can be further shrunk by increasing the number of 
antenna elements N and/or by allocating more power to artificial noise 
(i.e. increasing the ratio q/p), which are common strategies used in DM 
systems [2]. 
The above common proposition claimed in previous FDA-DM 
works will be rebutted in the following section. 
V. SECURE RECEPTION REGIONS ‘PROPAGATE’ IN RANGE AS TIME 
ELAPSES IN FDA-DM SYSTEMS 
In this section, the authors argue that the constructed FDA-DM 
systems, formulated in (11), CANNOT secure wireless transmissions 
in range domain. The misinterpretation of (11) was rooted in the 
treatment of time t. Like the example shown in Fig. 2, the previous 
FDA-DM works use far-field patterns in 2D angle-range domain at a 
selected time reference when the legitimate receiver samples 
detected signals, to claim the secure transmission in range domain. 
Thus, the patterns, such as those plotted in Fig. 2, are the field 
distributions at that chosen time instant.  
Two problems are associated with this time treatment; 
1) At the legitimate receiver end, in order to perform demodulation, 
the entire modulation symbol with a symbol period T is frequency 
down-converted first, before baseband sampling. Within this T, the 
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(b) 
Fig. 3.  Simulation example of previously reported FDA-DM system in its 
general form in (11). System parameters are listed in Table I (except time t). (a) 
Magnitudes and (b) phases of electric (or magnetic) fields in range domain 
when θ = θ0 = 40º and t = 210
−5 s (pathloss is removed for illustration 
purpose). 
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term exp[j2π(n−1)∆f(t−r1/c)] in the second summation in (11) is not 
identical for each n, indicating the artificial noise cannot be 
perfectly cancelled out at the selected location (θ0, R). The amount 
of the remaining artificial noise for the legitimate receiver is 
determined by the system parameters, in particular N, ∆f, and T. 
This aspect has never been studied, while the second problem 
discussed below is more critical, which invalidates the previously 
reported FDA-DM systems; 
2) The early FDA-DM works used the beamforming patterns at the 
selected time instant to calculate secure reception regions, claiming 
range-domain wireless security. However, the eavesdroppers do 
not necessarily sample the signals at the same time instant as 
the desired receiver does. Taking the same FDA-DM example 
with the settings in Table I (except time t), the simulated 
range-domain far-field patterns at the time instant t = (Re − R)/c = 
(36 km – 30 km)/c = 210−5 s are illustrated in Fig. 3. It is assumed 
that an eavesdropper receiver is positioned at (θe = θ0 = 40º, Re = 36 
km). From Fig. 3, it can be clearly seen that the secure reception 
region (for this example it is the location where the well-formatted 
QPSK IQ constellations/waveforms are preserved) ‘propagates’ at 
the speed of light, as time elapses. Similarly, when θe = θ0 and Re < 
R, the well-preserved signal waveforms pass the eavesdropper at 
the time instant (R − Re)/c ahead the time reference. To conclude, 
NO secure transmissions in range domain can be achieved by 
the previously reported FDA-DM systems. 
 
Another intuitive explanation of why the FDA-DM systems 
cannot provide range-domain security is presented below: 
Assuming a legitimate receiver positioned at (θ0, R) in free space 
detects electromagnetic waves which correspond to desired 
modulation symbols, these electromagnetic waves, spatially combined 
by each electromagnetic wave radiated from each transmit antenna, 
propagate at the speed of light along θ0, irrespective of their 
frequencies. Therefore, the same signal waveforms (subject to 
magnitude scaling) detected by the legitimate receiver reach every 
points along θ0 at different time instants when the far-field condition is 
met. From this observation, it can be concluded that any FDA-DM 
arrangements, including their variants CANNOT provide secure 
wireless transmission in range domain in free space. 
 
Next, we briefly list the issues in some recent FDA-DM literatures; 
• [5]–[11]: 
A time dependent phase term (i.e. αn shown in (7) in this paper) was 
missing in {(5) in [5]; (4) in [6]; (2) in [7]; (3) in [8]; (6) in [9]; (4) in 
[10]; (2) in [11]} and all the analyses thereafter. This indicates that an 
assumption t = 0 was made for every receiver in the field. In other 
words, the authors in these works enforce legitimate and 
eavesdropping receivers sampling signals at the same instant, leading 
to erroneous conclusions;  
• [12]: 
The authors used the same time instant to sample the received 
signals at both legitimate and eavesdropping receivers, see (11) and 
(12) in [12]; 
• [13]: 
From (10) in [13], the author claimed that the radiation energy is 
focused at (θin, R). Mathematically, this can only be obtained when t = 
0. In fact, when t varies, it can be seen that this focusing point 
propagates at the speed of light in range domain; 
• [14], [15]: 
In {(9) in [14]; (4) in [15]}, the time ‘t’ in the denominator is the 
time reference the authors selected (when the legitimate receiver 
samples signals), while the time ‘t’ in the numerator should be the time 
instant when each receiver samples their detected signals. These two 
time ‘t’ are not necessarily identical. In fact, when different ‘t’ in 
numerator is chosen, it can be observed that the spatial focusing region 
propagates; 
• [25]: 
In fact, the Fig. 2 in [25] and the associated discussions clearly 
shown that the secure reception region propagates at the speed of light 
in range domain. However, the authors claimed that if the array 
excitation vector changes accordingly, the secure region does not 
propagate. This statement is erroneous, as the continuously altered 
array radiation at the transmitter end cannot instantly propagates 
through space. When the propagation delay is considered, it can be 
observed that the secure reception region propagates no matter the 
excitation vector changes or not. 
 
Based on the above analyses, the conclusions reached in some 
previous FDA works [5]–[15], [25] are unreliable. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The realization of DM scheme that allows security with respect to 
both direction and range domains is a significant research problem, 
with potentially high impact if solved. However, the paper 
demonstrated that such security cannot be obtained by combining DM 
with FDA when the time variable is incorporated in the investigated 
model. It has been demonstrated that the ‘secure area’ will propagate 
in range – similarly to any other electromagnetic signal – and 
consequently any eavesdropper located along the pre-defined direction 
is able to easily intercept the signal within limited time.  
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